p. 72You were to state some further difficulties of a practical character. I presume they are the old objections that have been answered a thousand times.—I am not sure about that. I do not suppose they are new. Very likely they have occurred to many others before me. But I have never seen them stated or answered anywhere.
What might they be like?—Well, to come to the point at once, the spectacle of human misery of such vast extent, in every country, lasting continuously from age to age, afflicts me exceedingly; and I find a difficulty in reconciling it with the idea that there is a superintending Infinite Power. I read that a sparrow cannot fall without the Father, and that the very hairs of the head are numbered: yet I see millions of sparrows perish and multitudes of heads with the brains battered out of them in African forays and on the field of battle, without anyone taking any heed. In the great towns of civilized life, p. 73 I am appalled at the chronic mass of simmering human misery with no one to interfere and without the least token of that superintendence which you are advocating and which I should like to believe. Human life seems everywhere what Carlyle calls “a weltering chaos.” There does not appear to be any superintendence or any plan. I confess I am frequently overwhelmed. A “horror of great darkness.” often settles on me. If you can relieve me, you will confer a boon unutterable.—I sympathize with your distress: the burden thereof is heavy. I have often felt it myself. But there is release.
That is what I desire.—I have observed that the burden has been heaviest when I have been weakest: when the light of knowledge has been least available There is a clue here. It points to the root of the disease. It is said that the discovery of a disease is the first step towards a remedy.
How do you diagnose the disease in this case?—I find the trouble lies in looking at the subject as a man—in contemplating it from the point of view of human feeling.
How else can we look at it or contemplate it?—If there is a God, there is another point of view.
But of what use can that point of view be to a man?—Of great use in judging of a Divine problem; because that is the aspect in which you are introducing it. You say you cannot reconcile the situation with the idea of a Divine superintendence.
Yes, or in other words, I cannot understand how such a state of things could be permitted if there is a God.—Very well, in considering that problem, you must not judge exclusively from the way the situation strikes you as a human being: you must also take into account how the thing may be from p. 74 a Divine point of view, seeing there are so many reasons for admitting (putting it mildly) the possible existence of that point of view.
But how can I judge the matter from a Divine point of view?—By considering how the thing must be from that point of view if it exists; and, in this connection, by considering what the Bible alleges concerning that point of view.
Is it possible to do so?—In a measure.
How would you shew it?—Well, take the Bible representation: “We are the clay: Thou our Potter.” Supposing pottery could feel, would it be capable of judging of man’s procedure towards it? Would it be justified in estimating that procedure in the light of its own feelings? Would not man’s point of view be the decisive point of view in the settlement of any question arising about pottery?
But you see pottery cannot feel.—No, but the relation of things between God and man is the same. Man is a mere form of substance belonging to God. He is but of yesterday. Time back, his race did not exist upon the earth. It cannot be that his point of view is the determining point of view in the decision of problems connected with the state of his race. It must be that God’s point of view is the determining point of view.
How do you bring that to bear?—Well, I say first, we must take Him in His ways as they actually are, and not as we may feel they ought to be. One of His actual ways is the presence and prevalence of the very evil you lament. Our part is to accept the fact and His explanation of the fact, and not to set up our own impressions against it.
Unfortunately, the fact we are obliged to accept. We cannot alter it. But as for the explanation, it p. 75 is beyond me.—It need not be: it is simple enough.
You mean the entrance of sin?—Yes, and all that is involved in that.
As an explanation, that, to me, is utterly inadequate. I cannot see that the greatness, power and goodness of God are consistent with the infliction of evil, age after age, on the helpless race of man, for any amount of disobedience of which he might be guilty. Nor do I think justice could find an easy place in such a conception. What have we to do with Adam’s sin?—My friend, you now abandon reason and put forward feeling. You tell me you cannot see this: you cannot feel that. What argument is there in that? It may argue want of eyes or want of sensibility. It cannot prove the things are not there to be seen and felt.
You are severe.—Nay, only logical. What argument of reason can you urge against death and evil being made the concomitants of sin? Is not God great?
God is great, but I should incline to think that would be a reason against your conclusion—not in favour of it. His greatness is so great that it must matter nothing to Him whether man obeys Him or not.—In a sense, no doubt that is true: but is it a reason why He should leave the door of eternal fellowship open to disobedience?
Surely it must please Him better that man should be happy even if disobedient.—But supposing it does not, what then? He has declared He is displeased with disobedience. Could you urge any reason against His being displeased with disobedience? Is not obedience beautiful and good? If so, is it not better that He should be displeased with disobedience than that He should be pleased or indifferent to it?
p. 76 You press me closely.—With reason. Now, if sin is hurtful to man and displeasing to God, is it not according to reason that a state of evil should accompany the ascendancy of sin?
Yes, but as I understand it is sin we did not commit—sin of Adam before we were born—helpless sin—unintentional sin; why should we suffer for that?—Not for that only. It is not Adam’s sin only. It is our own sin as well. Is there a man who has not sinned? Is not the whole world sunk in sin?
If I say, “Yes,” I concede your point.—Can you say “No”?
I admit the world is in a bad way.—Is it not in a disobedient way? And is not this sin? Paul says Jews and Gentiles are all under sin. Now if sin reigns in the world from generation to generation, what objection of reason can there be to the reign of evil?
But why should goodness permit the necessity for evil arising? And why should Omnipotence suffer it to continue. I should have thought a Great and Powerful and All-wise Being would have prevented the mischief at the root; and at the least, having suffered it to come, I should have expected Him to apply a remedy that would take it entirely away.—Here again, you unwittingly place your judgment against His. I admit there would be great force in your questions and suggestions if evil had come to stay. I could not answer you on the popular supposition of an eternal hell.
Oh, you don’t believe in the eternity of evil then?—Not in the popular sense.
In any sense?—I believe the judgment of God will always prevail, to the extinction of evil and evil men; but not that sin means eternal torment for any.
p. 77 Well, that eases the problem of some of its difficulty.—My friend, there is no difficulty when you survey the matter from the Divine point of view, which is the only point of view it truly has, for man is nothing. Especially does all difficulty vanish when the end of the matter is taken into view.